Africa’s sore spot: regional conflicts across the Middle and the Horn by Jacobs, AD
Editor:  Daniel Möckli
Series Editor:  Andreas Wenger
Authors: Myriam Dunn Cavelty, Jonas Grätz, An Jacobs,  
 Prem Mahadevan, Daniel Möckli 
Center for Security Studies
Key Developments in Global Affairs
STRATEGIC
TRENDS 2012
ETH Zurich
CSS
STRATEGIC TRENDS 2012 is also available electronically on the Strategic Trends 
Analysis website at: www.sta.ethz.ch
Editor STRATEGIC TRENDS 2012: Daniel Möckli 
Series Editor STRATEGIC TRENDS: Andreas Wenger
Contact:
Center for Security Studies
ETH Zurich
Haldeneggsteig 4, IFW
CH-8092 Zurich
Switzerland
This publication covers events up to 12 March 2012.
© 2012, Center for Security Studies, ETH Zurich
All images © by Reuters (except Chapter 5, © by CSS)
ISSN 1664-0667 
ISBN 978-3-905696-36-3
35
A soldier of the UN/African Union UNAMID peacekeeping force in Sudan, 11 January 2011
CHAPTER 3
Africa’s sore spot: Regional conflicts 
across the Middle and the Horn
An Jacobs 
Despite positive messages of democratisation and economic growth, 
sub-Saharan Africa remains afflicted by severe conflicts. The Middle and the 
Horn host the most widespread and intense of them. Resources and ethno-
religious differences are often part of the equation, but the core problem 
rests with bad governance. Political elites use underlying frictions to fight 
regional wars, all too often fuelled by third-party resource grabs. Until 
regional dynamics are better understood and addressed through conflict 
management and trade harmonisation, Africa will continue to seriously 
suffer.
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Africa has been climbing up the 
international policy agenda for 
some time now, but not fast 
enough. Despite the newspaper 
headlines across the globe heralding a 
new era of democratisation and eco-
nomic growth, a closer look at the 
regional dynamics on the continent 
paints a very different picture. No 
one can deny that sub-Saharan Africa 
has witnessed more elections over the 
course of the last three decades, but 
these have been short-term ‘ballot 
box’ exercises rather than structural 
democratic practices of good govern-
ance. Elections, invariably labelled 
‘free and fair’, have been little more 
than a show of pretence to guaran-
tee a next term for those in office. In 
Africa, corruption continues to rule.
The same holds for economic progress. 
Emerging markets – busy investing in 
African infrastructure and resources – 
consider those investments increasing-
ly vital to guarantee their own growth. 
But the BRICs are not building an 
economically and politically more 
solid Africa. Foreign direct investment 
has increased – both in volume and in 
geographical spread – but as a result, 
volatile commodity prices are becom-
ing increasingly difficult for Africa to 
manage. Equity deals seeking direct 
control of African resources has been 
the BRIC response, many of which 
have admittedly laid the foundations 
for growth in telecommunications, 
business services, sales, and manufac-
turing sectors. But if Africa is to create 
meaningful wealth from its resources, 
then credible and appropriate govern-
ment policies are urgently needed. 
Filling labour gaps, enhancing mar-
ket growth, and providing a desirable 
investment infrastructure is not easy, 
and points to the core problem ahead: 
African resources are vast, the growth 
potential enormous, but neither can 
match the persistent political risk and 
regional instability sweeping across 
the continent. 
 
Large parts of sub-Saharan Africa 
have indeed been almost unremit-
tingly subject to conflicts, preventing 
an African ‘take-off’ anything close to 
what we have seen in Asia. What is 
worse, such conflicts have invariably 
grown regional tentacles, making any 
effective resolution to them increas-
ingly difficult. Such a point might 
seem obvious, but regional thinking 
has not sunk in on a political level in 
Africa, nor with the international ac-
tors involved in conflict resolution. 
Until regional dynamics are better 
understood and better addressed, 
Africa is unlikely to make the kind 
of advancement that  international 
headlines would have us believe. Re-
gional problems require regional and 
international solutions if Africa is to 
progress.
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The ‘numbers’ are revealing. About 
two-third of the world’s fragile states 
are located in Africa, with the most 
deadly and most persistent conflict 
hub in Central and Eastern Africa. 
This region, stretching from Kinshasa 
to Djibouti and from Khartoum 
to Lubumbashi, hosts some of the 
major regional hotbeds of conflict be-
low the Sahara. Large territories across 
the borders of the Democratic Repub-
lic of Congo (DRC), (South) Sudan, 
Somalia, and adjoining countries have 
seen chronic  regional instability as 
the day-to-day  trend; without major 
remedial action, it will be the defining 
feature for decades to come. 
In geopolitical terms, this region is 
closely watched across the globe to 
monitor political risk for resource 
extraction and foreign direct invest-
ment. The Middle and the Horn 
share a shaken recent history, and 
both face a bumpy road ahead. 2011 
was critical, and the outlook for 2012 
does not look much better. Turbu-
lent Congolese presidential elections 
have attracted international headlines 
in November last year. Discontent 
with electoral practices and out-
comes now continues to endanger 
stability in the DRC, and with Tshi-
sekedi’s supporters seemingly unwill-
ing to accept Kabila’s second term, 
post-electoral developments remain 
unsure at this stage. South Sudan 
became the youngest country in the 
world in July 2011, and as is often 
the case with young age, there is a 
lot to learn. Independence has so far 
only brought more conflict in terms 
of demarcating borders and securing 
oil revenues. But internal issues have 
also cropped up; inter-ethnic conflict 
is widespread, as are battles between 
the brand-new government and local 
militias. The country currently faces 
violent uprisings across its territory, 
with the real risk of becoming a failed 
state less than a year after being born. 
Elections in Somalia – planned for 
August 2012 – are another event to 
watch. Western support for the Tran-
sitional Federal Government (TFG) 
in Mogadishu hopes for a popular and 
legal TFG mandate to govern after 
the elections, but confidence remains 
remarkably low that this will happen. 
Somalia is easily the best (or indeed 
worst) African example of a collapsed 
state, particularly with different gra-
dations of Islamist extremism thriv-
ing within and beyond its borders. It 
appears the Kenyan Defence Forces 
are better prepared for the 2012 elec-
tions than they were in 2007, a year 
which marked widespread violence 
on the streets of Nairobi. It would be 
a serious setback for East Africa if this 
situation repeated itself. But beyond 
trying to hold their ‘electoral nerves’, 
many of these states still have to cope 
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tions in Central and Eastern Africa. 
And amongst these struggles rest per-
sistent Western concerns that Chinese 
(and other BRIC) activities in sub-
Saharan Africa hav  everything to do 
with resource grabs, and little with 
sustainable development.
with the brutal violence of Joseph 
Kony’s Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). 
Having originated in U anda, Kony’s 
men are now active across the DRC, 
the Central African Republic (CAR), 
and South Sudan. These are just a few 
examples indicating the dismal condi-
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same: Without fresh thinking and 
serious international action to deal 
with Africa’s central and eastern hot 
spots, an unstable region will go from 
bad to worse in the years ahead.
Natural resources
‘Find resources, and you’ll find con-
flict’, seems to be a general sub-Saha-
ran rule. It should not be. Commodi-
ties do not drive conflict any more 
than they promote corruption and 
poor governance, but their monetary 
values do add to the human potential 
to do so. Is coltan really to blame for 
violence in North Kivu, and oil for 
instability in (South) Sudan? Does 
the cross-border presence of oil, gems, 
minerals, and timber catalyse or sup-
port brewing conflicts? Is there really 
such a thing as a resource curse, or is 
it just bad governance? In many cases, 
an abundance of natural resources 
might have created incentives for 
warfare, but while resources perhaps 
facilitate conflict, they never start a 
war independently. 
Sudan is a case in point. Eighty per 
cent of the oil revenue from former 
Sudan is estimated to be on what has 
recently become South Sudanese soil. 
But then the infrastructure required 
to extract that oil and transport it to 
Port Sudan on the Red Sea – think 
of pipelines, export depots, and pro-
cessing plants – is in North Sudanese 
Matters in theatre are, of course, much 
more multifaceted and perhaps even 
ungraspable. But too many analysts 
still look at conflicts around the Great 
Lakes with single-faceted narratives: 
underplaying certain aspects (resourc-
es and Chinese involvement), while 
overplaying others (ethnicity) and 
largely overlooking regional dynamics. 
Grouping countries into sub-regional 
conflict zones is intricate, with a com-
plex web of conflicting parties overlap-
ping on various levels and across re-
gions. Delineating conflicts from each 
other and drawing clear-cut lines as to 
where one war zone stops and another 
starts is close to impossible, but that 
should not weaken the key point here: 
Major conflicts in the Middle and the 
Horn of Africa are largely regional and 
demand regional solutions. 
Understanding the nature of  
sub-Saharan conflicts
In what follows, some of the under-
lying drivers of conflict are explored; 
natural resources, ethnic and religious 
clashes, and perhaps most damagingly, 
the role of political elites pulling the 
strings behind the scenes. All these 
factors have a regional aspect, leading 
us then towards a closer analysis of – 
often disappointing – regional and 
international engagements in theatre. 
New actors (most notably China) are 
changing the reality to some degree, 
but the key conclusion remains the 
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owned by the Greater Nile Petroleum 
Operating Company (GNPOC), a 
consortium of Chinese, Malaysian, 
Indian, and Sudanese companies.
You might think that resource wealth 
would provide a good incentive for 
better North-South cooperation, but 
oil not only served to enhance seces-
sionist claims in the first place, both 
sides are now also taking each other 
hostage in economic terms. The 
North is demanding transit fees mas-
sively above reasonable market rates 
for the only export route available. 
hands. This implies that both coun-
tries not only depend economically on 
oil as their key export, but also on each 
other to profit and turn oil into hard 
cash. This obviously requires cross-
country collaboration – but with bor-
der disputes on-going, much is still to 
be settled between North and South 
on future oil exploitation. The pre-
cise boundary remains undefined and 
‘border-line’ regions such as Abyei and 
South Kordofan remain plagued by 
unrest. In the midst of this violence, 
we find the major Asian oil companies: 
Oil fields in South Sudan are largely 
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agriculture and societal development. 
As a result, children have been re-
cruited not just for artisanal mining, 
but also as soldiers to join Mai-Mai 
rebel groups fighting against external 
coltan ownership. 
Given the large coltan, copper, and 
timber reserves, international interest 
in the DRC is as high as governance 
standards remain low. China’s logic is 
simple: Cheap Chinese labour, pro-
ducing electronic devices with cheap-
ly extracted African coltan, is the way 
to keep Western buyers happy and 
Chinese balance sheets healthy. As 
the world’s largest exporter of small 
arms, China has not exactly shied 
away from providing weapons (and 
cash) in exchange for oil concessions 
and mining deals in violence-sensitive 
countries. This is a ‘quality’ it sadly 
shares with many Western states, 
though concealed in China’s ‘no ques-
tions asked’ diplomatic approach. 
Even if China’s approach is question-
able, ‘resource curse’ issues are by no 
means new. Again, resources do not 
extract themselves. They are merely 
enablers of conflict, underpinned by 
the political agendas of local actors 
involved. Domestic and international 
political institutions are vital for de-
termining how resources are extracted 
and consumed. If host governments 
fail to ask for favourable terms and 
But the South is not passively awaiting 
solutions; it is exploring possibilities 
to build new pipelines to the Kenyan 
coast. Even within the so far undefined 
South-Sudanese borders, the unequal 
distribution of oil revenue has created 
tensions across ethnic groups that have 
to live with the social and environ-
mental downsides of oil extraction, but 
see little of the benefits. 
Meanwhile, new oil finds in Uganda 
will have to be managed carefully by 
Kampala. As other African exam-
ples have shown, even well-educated 
labour forces and solid administrative 
and economic structures can crumble 
when resource wealth crops up. Cor-
ruption needs to be constrained and 
wealth distributed more equally for 
Uganda to make the most of its new-
found oil. 
Apart from being a major incentive 
for corruption, resource wealth has 
not only been triggering war, but also 
directly funding it. Mineral reserves 
in the DRC are vast, but they have 
fuelled more conflicts within and be-
yond its territory than they have at-
tracted FDI. Congo has about 80 per 
cent of the world’s coltan reserves – a 
rare metal that is crucial for the devel-
opment of electronic devices. Alas, de-
mand for such a rare commodity has 
so far translated into widespread envi-
ronmental degradation pushing aside 
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and religion are rarely the roots of 
conflicts, but different ethnic and re-
ligious groups are played off against 
each other by political leaders to win 
power struggles at far higher levels. 
Put bluntly, political leaders strategi-
cally use ethno-religious differences 
to shape the socio-cultural ‘reality’ 
of their territory. The best example is 
probably the Hutu and Tutsi distinc-
tion in Burundi and Rwanda, which 
only became problematic once they 
were administratively registered by 
Belgium, and later by the domes-
tic authorities, eventually leading to 
genocide. In a similar example of us-
ing religious means for political ends, 
Mai-Mai soldiers in eastern Congo, 
whose spiritual beliefs include the 
conviction that supernatural powers 
make them invincible, were used by 
Kabila to fight Mobutu back in the 
days. The Mai-Mai has not stopped 
being a dreaded rebel group since, 
causing insecurity in eastern Congo. 
To find a more recent example of 
politically ‘steered’ ethnic violence, 
wind the clock forward to the Dar-
fur conflict, promoted by Khartoum 
as an ‘African against Arab’ issue. 
Likewise, the differences between the 
dominant Islamist Northern part of 
the country and the largely secular 
South were underscored by political 
elites to achieve separation. But active 
armed groups in South Sudan have 
high environmental, social, and gov-
ernance standards, few international 
investors will voluntarily provide 
them. Amid these already dismal con-
ditions, things are also becoming more 
complex due to the regional dynamics. 
In large part, this is driven by emerg-
ing market investments in extraction 
and shipping of natural resources. 
The Chinese – and to a lesser extent 
other BRICs – are providing critical 
infrastructure to get resources out of 
Africa and onto ships. While this 
serves economic interests in Beijing, 
regionalised resource extraction is now 
also intermingling and even support-
ing regional conflicts. Coltan extrac-
tion in the DRC, and the unrest and 
conflicts around it, have managed 
to draw in countries like Rwanda, 
Burundi, Uganda, Chad, and Angola. 
The same logic also applies to wide-
spread communication technology in 
Africa; it may have helped to close a 
global digital gap, but it has also en-
abled ‘bad neighbourhoods’ – such 
as the Great Lakes region – to grow 
through communication links. The 
outcome is clear: Resources have gone 
regional as far as supply chains are 
concerned, but they have also brought 
considerable risk, in that conflicts have 
duly followed. 
Ethnic and religious clashes
Rather like resources, a wealth of em-
pirical evidence shows that ethnicity 
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between the autonomous Puntland 
region and the self-proclaimed inde-
pendent Somaliland. 
Ethno-religious clashes – whether 
politically steered or not – also have 
a relatively high risk of spillover and 
thus, regional disruption. For Soma-
lia, this has become all the more true 
now that al-Shabaab has been for-
mally endorsed by al-
Qaeda. Yet, on closer 
inspection, the ‘eth-
nic’ argument does 
not hold on a regional level. The LRA 
originated as a self-proclaimed ethnic 
movement in Uganda. The rebels de-
clared that their aim was to protect 
the Acholi community in the north 
against Museveni’s centrist policies 
and arms. But what might have been 
true of the 1980s, has been trans-
formed into rebels without a credible 
ethnic cause who merely plunder, rape, 
and kill, everywhere but in Uganda. 
They have been active in the CAR, 
the DRC, and South Sudan, moving 
effortlessly across borders, reaching 
further and further into the respective 
countries, especially the DRC. 
This is problematic for the DRC, not 
least because it has more than enough 
of its own rebel groups to deal with – 
most of which fight the government 
or each other, or resort to plunder-
ing the population. The best-known 
now turned the tables and accused the 
government of scheming against local 
tribes by refusing to acknowledge 
their socio-economic rights. Indeed, 
resulting in the displacement of thou-
sands of people, this has led to intensi-
fied inter-ethnic warfare. Politics and 
power is what sits at the heart of this 
violence, not so-called ethnic clashes. 
To underscore the Sudanese case even 
more, Khartoum has re-
portedly sponsored or-
ganisations reinforcing 
Islamist uprisings (e.g., 
in Eritrea, Uganda, and Somalia) but 
also put its weight behind the non-
Arab LRA, which underscores the po-
litical – rather than religious – nature 
of this. 
On the face of it, Somalia presents an 
exception to this rule. Religion has 
played, and will continue to play, a 
key role in domestic struggles – albeit 
marked by Islamic fragmentation. Isla-
mist rebel groups such as al-Shabaab 
and Hizbul Islam strongly oppose the 
TFG and Sufi groups (mistakenly seen 
as an Islamist sect, but really a more 
moderate dimension of Islam) like 
Ahlu Sunna wal Jama’a (ASWJ). But 
when it comes to Somalia, let us not 
forget that in the absence of nation-
wide governance structures, powerful 
religious leaders invariably replace le-
gitimately endorsed political elites. 
The country also faces serious conflicts 
The ‘ethnic’ argument 
does not hold 
on a regional level
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Somalia is even more worrying. The 
internationally recognised TFG is 
fighting al-Shabaab on its territory, 
but has achieved remarkably little in 
terms of stability since taking office. 
Domestic clashes and subsequent 
regional shockwaves would hardly 
come as a shock after the August elec-
tions – assuming they actually hap-
pen in the first place. The TFG’s pre-
mature claim to another three years 
in office – not much to the liking of 
al-Shabaab – is bound to provoke 
violent reactions within and beyond 
the country’s boundaries. On a more 
general level, and beyond al-Shabaab, 
the real problem is that Sharif ’s lead-
ership has been weak and corrupt, 
and most importantly, endeavours 
to forcefully centralise a state that in 
essence embodies a collection of 
clans. Bypassing local leadership ob-
viously does not sit well with local 
grassroots movements. This has 
turned Somalia into a fragmented 
‘centre versus clan’ battlefield, ren-
dering the country increasingly dys-
functional. This does not imply a 
state of anarchy. In fact, local clans 
are organised very strongly, but at 
a national level these distinct pieces 
are becoming almost impossible to 
pull together. Little surprise that 
high-return ‘careers’ in piracy con-
tinue to flourish in Somalia, with 
many regional authorities accepting 
money to turn a blind eye to such 
examples are the Enyele fighters in the 
north-western province of Equateur, 
the Democratic Forces for the Libera-
tion of Rwanda (FDLR), and the Mai-
Mai rebels in the eastern provinces 
of Kivu and Orientale. Despite the 
presence of MONUC and the Con-
golese Armed Forces (FARDC), these 
groups so far have proven unstoppa-
ble – endangering security not only in 
the DRC, but also across neighbour-
ing countries. Yet, the common factor 
accounting both for the longevity and 
lethality of these groups in the DRC, 
Uganda, Somalia, and Sudan is not 
ethnicity or religion, but politics.
Political elites
Conflicts do not emerge solely due to 
the existence of natural resources or of 
ethno-religious fault lines. These are 
mere facilitators, used to conceal the 
cause of most conflicts: politics. ‘Bad 
neighbourhoods’ hardly ever have 
good leadership. The likes of Kabila 
and Museveni often leave little room 
for democracy and economic growth. 
Post-electoral battles have underscored 
the ‘true’ meaning of the word democ-
racy in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo: retaining power at all costs. 
Like Kenya, where Odinga might not 
have a smooth electoral ride this year 
with secessionist claims popping up 
on the coastline, the DRC is definitely 
one to watch in 2012 for future con-
flict.
45
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by political desires. But as South 
Sudanese independence disposed of 
the common (northern) enemy, the 
old internal fault lines become more 
apparent. The mosaic of ethnic com-
munities in South Sudan, where mi-
litias are still being ideologically fed 
and kept alive by local leaders, now 
needs good governance at multiple 
levels. Local dynamics beyond Juba 
are essential to the new-born coun-
try’s resource-rich soil, but the ruling 
Sudan People’s Liberation Movement 
(SPLM) has established its territorial 
presence, and it refuses to jeopardise 
individual power and money for a 
more decentralised state structure.
activities. Piracy has hit not only the 
Gulf of Aden, but attacks have been 
registered along the Kenyan and Tan-
zanian coastlines, many miles out 
into the Indian Ocean – and on some 
accounts, even as far as the Seychelles. 
‘Conflict resolution’ in Sudan will be 
delayed by resource questions and eth-
nic uprisings, but the key problem lies 
with political desires for pieces of terri-
tory. Omar al-Bashir is yet another ex-
ample of corrupt leadership suffering 
from ‘land lust’. Secessionist move-
ments in South Sudan and Somaliland 
have demanded independence, again 
resulting in societal insecurity caused 
The Middle and the Horn of Africa: Countries in comparison
Country Population  
(million)
Real growth  
rate (%)
People in  
poverty (%)*
Corruption  
Perception Index**
Burundi 10,2 4.2 81 172
CAR 5,0 4.1 62.8 154
Chad 10,8 2.5 NA 168
DRC 71,7 6.5 59.2 168
Ethiopia 90,9 7.4 39 120
Kenya 41,1 5.3 19.7 154
Rwanda 11,4 7 76.8 46
Somalia 9,9 2.6 NA 182
South Sudan 8,2 NA NA NA
Sudan 36,8 -0.2 NA 177
Uganda 34,6 6.4 28.7 143
*  Less than US$ 1.25 per day
**  Rank out of 182 countries
Sources: Transparency International, UNDP, CIA World Factbook 2011
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development, and halted peace talks. 
Add to this the endemic border dis-
putes and a failed Comprehensive 
Peace Agreement, and it becomes 
clear that independence is by no 
means a fast track to a war-free neigh-
bourhood. 
The overall upshot is that conflicts in 
Central and Eastern Africa are com-
plex. While a toxic mix of resources, 
supposed ethno-religious divisions, 
and weak governance, they are in-
variably driven by political elites with 
ignitable political agendas. This ex-
plosive assortment of political desires 
and regional volatility is at the core of 
Central and East Africa’s problems, 
but it is also where some of the most 
crucial solutions can be found in 
terms of pan-African and internatio-
nal initiatives to stabilise the region. 
The multiple responses to  
African conflicts 
If the causes are complex, what about 
the solutions? Just how regional are 
African and international responses 
to conflicts in the Middle and the 
Horn? Getting African leaders to 
sit around a table together is one 
thing, but how actively do they really 
prevent conflict across their borders? 
Answers to these questions are criti-
cally important, not least because 
they highlight the regional and inter-
national voids affecting peacekeeping 
The crucial problem is that while key 
facilitators of conflict in Central and 
Eastern Africa are increasingly re-
gional, the political elites on all levels 
still work from a national basis. Self-
regarding policies reflect little concern 
for the security situation in remote 
regions on their own territories, let 
alone for what happens beyond na-
tional borders. As noted, the LRA is 
not about domestic ethnic issues, but 
about regional politics. The Armed 
Forces of Uganda are probably the 
only army in the region capable of 
stopping Kony’s rampage across DRC, 
CAR, and South Sudanese borders. 
But with the LRA no longer on Ugan-
dan soil, Museveni has lost interest in 
providing troop contributions to help 
solve the matter.
Meanwhile, tensions between Chad 
and Sudan over supporting rebel 
groups across borders have eased, 
but only because it suited new politi-
cal priorities, not because of changed 
interaction between different ethnic 
groups. In light of recent elections 
and South Sudanese independence, 
it seemed like a good idea to adhere 
to the Joint Border Force established 
in 2010. To achieve an agreement on 
the North-South divide, the goodwill 
of oil companies, local communities, 
and the governments involved will be 
vital. But so far, pipeline politics have 
hampered stability, harmed economic 
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been part of the equation, and even 
where the Union has acted, it has 
been as feeble as it has been selective. 
PSC has supported military ‘action’ 
in Sudan and Somalia, but entirely 
ignored violence in northern Uganda 
and in parts of Ethiopia. A major 
recent challenge has been to diver-
sify regional approaches and to clarify 
institutional competences to avoid 
overlap. The CEWS, for example, has 
struggled to clarify its relationships 
with regional early warning mecha-
nisms such as the Intergovernmental 
Authority for Development’s Conflict 
Early Warning and Response mecha-
nism (CEWARN) for East Africa and 
the ECOWAS Warning and Response 
Network (ECOWARN) in West Africa. 
Whereas its task delineation and ope-
rational practices are increasingly 
defined through data analysis and ad-
visory services, its link with the PSC 
and regional efforts remains underde-
veloped and blurry. 
Some evidence of sub-continental 
regional thinking can, however, be 
found in the creation of the African 
Standby Force, based on five regional 
brigades of roughly 4,300 troops. Al-
though the Eastern Force (EASBRIG) 
managed to complete more military-
technical adaptation than the Central 
Force (FOMAC), it is highly unlikely 
that either of them will reach agreed 
targets in time. More worryingly, 
and conflict resolution in the region. 
Getting such policies right is all the 
more imperative with new actors ap-
pearing on the scene, most notably 
China. Beijing has a big interest in 
natural resources, but less so in peace 
and security. We look at this inflam-
mable mix below. 
African institutions
Sitting around collective tables seems 
to be popular in Africa; cross-border 
peacekeeping institutions have seen 
nearly as rapid a rise as the number of 
members signed up for a seat. At least 
on paper, things look good. Among 
pan-African initiatives, the African 
Union, managing to delegate peace 
and security tasks within the contours 
of the AU Commission, is proclaimed 
to be the most important development 
over the past ten years. An adjoining 
Peace and Security Council (PSC) – 
based in Addis Ababa – was set up in 
2004, which (in theory) is responsible 
for early warning and prompt respons-
es to emerging crises. The Continental 
Early Warning System (CEWS) was 
established to gather information on 
crises, and to offer advice on the 
appropriate response. 
Building a functioning peace and se-
curity architecture obviously takes 
time, but after ten years of AU exist-
ence, the actual outputs have been 
meagre. Preventing conflicts has not 
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cial and political support to ECCAS, 
while preferring old-school bilateral 
relations. Mutual suspicion and do-
mestic corruption do not help; most 
African states are keeping a closer eye 
on their direct neighbours rather than 
making serious ECCAS contribu-
tions. 
The analytical point is clear: African 
security institutions look good on pa-
per, but perform poorly in practice. 
Inadequate political 
(and therefore finan-
cial) support kills any 
organisation in the 
long run. Data collection has been 
hindered by most of the governments 
involved, and the sovereignty ques-
tion provides an excellent excuse to 
guarantee the continuity of incum-
bent regimes. Security institutions 
arguably exist largely as a good rap-
port to ease external donors, and up-
hold governments in power. When 
peace talks do take place, political 
elites and leaders of armed divisions 
make sure they get the best seats at 
the negotiation table. 
 
Actions from Africa and the West
These points are not raised merely 
to criticise institutions, but to high-
light the major challenges they face. 
Few can doubt that institutions have 
tried to become regional players, 
but cross-border actions remain the 
behind this regional discourse sits a 
traditional problem: The actual output 
of these brigades rests in the hands of 
a collection of political elites. ‘Actions 
speak louder than words’ seems to be 
an alien expression to politicians in-
volved, with predictable operational 
results: a lack of continuity, prob-
lems of interoperability, absence of a 
common doctrine, and insufficient 
logistics. Too often, illusory politi-
cal engagement fails to translate into 
actual deployment. The 
establishment of the so-
called Panel of the Wise 
at first seemed a step in 
the right direction, but without suffi-
cient financial resources, their media-
tion and reconciliation efforts remain 
nothing more than good intentions. 
On the regional level, we can see a 
similar institutional story. In Central 
Africa, the Economic Community of 
Central African States (ECCAS) – with 
the blessing of the AU and the EU – 
has been given the task of dealing with 
peace and security in the region. With 
a formal architecture established, 
ECCAS once again looks reasonable 
on paper. A Peace and Security Coun-
cil for Central Africa (COPAX) with 
regional headquarters was established. 
But the lack of political will and sup-
port has seriously hampered the actual 
functioning of the structure. Leaders 
have refrained from providing finan-
African security 
institutions look good 
on paper
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SOM. As the main troop contributor 
to AMISOM, Uganda has been de-
clared a target of al-Shabaab, a dec-
laration that has proven to be more 
than a mere threat. No Western gov-
ernment has dared to seriously cross 
the ‘Mogadishu line’ since the failure 
of US operations in 1993. Anti-piracy 
measures have remained a maritime 
affair, with no real consideration of 
‘boots on the ground’. Reducing 
the influence of al-Shabaab is also a 
hands-off political issue; the US only 
employs counter-terrorist measures 
when it believes national security 
interests to be at stake. 
Indeed, the bulk of US engagement 
is actually conducted through pri-
vate actors such as advisors from the 
Washington-based Bancroft Global 
Development, a private military 
company that is following up deve-
lopments in Mogadishu. The EU 
also prefers watching the race from 
the side-lines. The EU Training Mis-
sion (EUTM) of Somali soldiers sup-
ports AMISOM and is admittedly a 
good effort to provide much-needed 
skills to Somali platoons. But the 
training – conducted in cooperation 
with the Uganda People’s Defence 
Force (UPDF) – provides a dwarf-size 
solution to a giant problem. It is also 
based in the Bihanga training camp in 
Uganda, about 2,000 kilometres from 
Mogadishu. Unsurprisingly, there is 
exception rather than the rule due to 
the political constraints involved. AU 
initiatives to tackle the LRA never pro-
gressed beyond the operational plan-
ning stage, not least because external 
international support remained limit-
ed. The international dimension here 
is important, as it remains the larger 
operational presence. Pacification ef-
forts are almost never entirely African, 
nor entirely external. Many African 
governments have been involved in 
UN peacemaking negotiations on a 
political level, just as UN operations 
on African soil have deployed African 
troops or experts. If anything, UN 
and other non-African operations are 
larger than those launched by Afri-
cans themselves. African initiatives 
under the AU or the Southern African 
Development Community (SADC) 
have indeed been more selective and 
politically driven, but the geopolitical 
division of labour between interna-
tional and regional institutions seems 
obvious. 
The bottom line is that the AU deploys 
troops to failed states where Western 
troops fear to go. Darfur and Somalia 
are telling examples. AMISOM, the 
African Union Mission in Somalia, is 
mandated to manage the security situ-
ation in the country, support peace, 
and assist the TFG. Its mission is to 
prepare conditions in Somalia for UN 
deployments to one day replace AMI-
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keeping and state-building. Whether 
this has been due to a lack of interna-
tional political willingness or to oper-
ational delays on the side of the UN is 
debatable, but the end result has been 
widespread instability at enormous 
human cost. 
In more general terms, the problems 
undermining peacekeeping missions 
are many, ranging from budgetary 
and operational deficiencies to lack of 
control and political will. MONUC 
personnel allegedly even have become 
involved in atrocities in the eastern 
DRC themselves. Despite some ope-
rational successes, this mission still 
lacks legitimacy with the Congolese 
people, not least because MONUC 
peacekeepers have supposedly been 
busy closing gold deals with Congo-
lese, Kenyan, and Indian merchants 
rather than protecting Congolese 
civilians. An additional problem is 
the fact that Kinshasa plays host to 
a wide range of governments and 
international organisations, all trying 
to achieve different ends with different 
means. Indeed, conflicting actions 
of stakeholders in theatre have often 
produced nothing more than a policy 
mess. In the DRC, contradictions 
among the bilateral policies of France, 
the UK, and the US, and those of 
international organisations such the 
EU’s ongoing CSDP missions serve as 
a case in point.
little control over the troops after they 
return to their capital, except for the 
wages they receive if they remain faith-
ful to their assigned platoon. These 
wages are paid from American and 
Italian budgets, channelled through 
international accountants over a UN 
monitoring group in Kenya into the 
hands of the TFG. And this is only 
one thread of the web. Although AMI-
SOM has strengthened the TFG to 
gain ground in Mogadishu, the gov-
ernment’s overall military prospects 
are weakening. This gives the likes of 
al-Shabaab more room to manoeuvre, 
which allows famine to thrive in large 
parts of the country while keeping 
many humanitarian actors out. 
Similar lessons should already have 
been learned from Darfur. The AU 
Mission (AMIS) completely failed to 
contain regional violence before giv-
ing way to a far larger and more ca-
pable hybrid AU/UN peacekeeping 
force, UNAMID. Unfortunately, the 
time gap between the suggestion for a 
UN force and the actual launch of the 
mission in 2007 provided a window of 
opportunity for the conflict to esca-
late, taking on dreadful proportions 
along the borders with Chad and the 
CAR. In South Sudan, the UN mission 
launched at the time of independence 
(UNMIS) has been preoccupied with 
investigating large-scale killings rather 
than tending to its core tasks: peace-
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The difficulty in Africa is that such 
success stories are very difficult to 
‘copy-paste’ from one conflict to an-
other, and as leading Africa scholar 
Paul D. Williams has pointed out, in 
most cases, ‘African ownership will 
continue to be a politically correct 
but practically flawed idea’. Congo-
lese ownership for example, has by no 
means led to similar results, and with 
conflict spillover prevalent in the re-
gion, small successes in a country like 
Burundi are endangered by what hap-
pens across its borders. Regional dy-
namics are subject to the sheer com-
plexity of the problem, with armed 
gangs operating with different weap-
onries and methods across borders. 
That is problematic, precisely because 
peacekeeping efforts and mandates 
are inherently country-specific (or 
Given the complexity and enormity of 
the DRC, much of this is understand-
able, and other examples of where en-
gagement has been more effective and 
harmonious do exist. European SSR 
projects in Burundi have achieved pos-
itive results, albeit at a slow pace. Vari-
ous governments – mainly the Dutch, 
Belgian, and German – in coopera-
tion with the European Commission 
have shown exceptional coherence to 
their approach. Putting aside French 
military preferences on police reform, 
a common strategy has been agreed 
whereby separate actions complement 
rather than contradict each other. Im-
plementation has gone well, precisely 
because the generic nature of the pro-
grammes has left the main respon-
sibility for ongoing collaboration in 
Burundi’s hands. 
Sources: EU, UN, AU, mid-February 2012
AU/UN
International deployment in the Middle and the Horn of Africa
UN 29,886
- MONUSCO (DRC)  20,046
- UNISFA (Sudan)  3,823
- UNMISS (South Sudan)  6,017
AU 9,849
- AMISOM (Somalia)  9,849
Hybrid AU/UN 24,422
- UNAMID (Darfur)  24,422
EU 1,051
- EUTM (for Somalia)  130
- EU NAVFOR Somalia Atalanta  771
- EUPOL DRC  57
- EUSEC DRC  93
UN
EUAU
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tional LRA still pursues its de-
structive path. Civilians across the 
DRC-CAR-South Sudan border con-
tinue to suffer from its violence. More 
international engagement and bet-
ter regional cooperation could easily 
dispose of Kony and the LRA; until 
that happens, expect the violence to 
continue. 
China’s resource interests 
Opposing messages of trade and re-
source extraction hamper interna-
tional coherence even more. Although 
China continues to increase its troop 
contributions to UN peacekeeping, 
its trade policy is still far away from 
meeting international standards. Chi-
nese resource-grabs more often than 
not turn a blind eye to undemocratic 
and corrupt political practices. Using 
the principle of ‘non-intervention’ to 
their advantage, the Chinese proudly 
declare their adaptability to the poli-
tical culture of those they negotiate 
resource deals with. Democracy and 
transparent governance are not part 
of the script. Although Beijing can-
not be accused of ‘exporting conflict’ 
to Africa, the fact that China is will-
ing to take on far higher levels of 
political risk than Western counter-
parts shows why conflict is ‘good’ for 
Chinese business to some degree. If 
nothing else, it gives Chinese firms a 
comparative advantage when entering 
resource-rich conflict zones. 
sub-national), whereas conflicts travel 
across borders. The fact that the UN 
has recently recognised the cross-bor-
der nature of troubles in Sudan, Ugan-
da, the DRC, and the CAR is a start, 
but serious regional actions should 
now follow for it to mean anything in 
theatre. 
The seemingly invincible nature of 
the LRA provides a telling regional 
example. With the US-backed opera-
tion Lightning Thunder having failed 
to eliminate the LRA, MONUSCO 
(the DRC), UNMISS (South Sudan), 
and BINUCA (the CAR) should now 
all pool efforts and resources to chase 
the LRA where it is still active. As an 
AU mission under a UN mandate, 
this would provide greater legitimacy 
for actions, as well as putting renewed 
pressure on Kampala to engage forces. 
But even here, Congolese political 
concerns about resource-related in-
tentions of the Ugandan forces on its 
soil have created high levels of distrust 
between governing elites. The results 
are increased secrecy, obstructed ac-
cess for Ugandans to some areas, 
and information-sharing failures at 
the Joint Intelligence and Operation 
Centre in Dungu. This, in turn, has 
undermined CAR-Uganda relations 
to the point where the CAR and the 
DRC have asked the UPDF to leave. 
The depressing outcome is that an 
increasingly fractured and dysfunc-
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harmful politics. African responses 
have improved in terms of regional 
and pan-African responses on paper, 
but they have rarely (if ever) delivered 
effective regional solutions in practice.
Corruption, violent domestic circum-
stances, secret data gathering, mutual 
distrust, and obscure resource deals 
have all made effective regional co-
ordination impossible. Even when 
international actors have been in-
volved, the UN has more often than 
not failed to get African players to co-
operate better. Although efforts have 
been made, Europe’s mark in Africa 
has been weak, while the US has sent 
contradictory messages. For all the in-
vestments China has made in Africa, 
the most important one of all, ‘good 
governance’, has been lacking when 
it comes to natural resource manage-
ment. If any of these problems are to 
be resolved, international and African 
efforts have to be far more closely 
aligned to facilitate regional responses 
to regional problems. That applies as 
much to the peace and security in-
frastructure as it does to resource ex-
traction and transportation. It is the 
only way to contain – and even more 
crucially, prevent – future conflicts 
within and beyond the Middle and 
Horn of Africa. 
Into 2012, major concerns need 
to be raised as to whether broader 
In that sense, Africa is becoming a 
level playing field to assess the limits 
of (profitable) conflict. The ‘win-win’ 
approach the Chinese claim to have 
is in fact Janus-faced: While using the 
positive image of South-South cooper-
ation to assuage international (devel-
opment) critics, it disproportionately 
benefits African elites. Resource-rich 
and governance-poor go hand in hand 
in the world of African corruption: 
Only a very small part of the Chi-
nese investment actually improves the 
life of the average African civilian. It 
could even be argued that Chinese 
labour shipped directly to Africa has 
actually increased unemployment and 
poverty. Chinese engagement in East 
Congo has even pushed young locals 
to join the Mai-Mai rebels in search of 
a livelihood. China’s non-interference 
policy might be acceptable in theory, 
but it has caused enormous difficulties 
in practice, particularly when resource 
wealth, weapons, and politics collide 
(see also Chapter 1 in this publication).
Africa’s sore spot demands  
rapid regional remedies
What has been shown is that conflicts 
in Central and East Africa represent 
complex problems with multiple cau-
salities and stakeholders. Resource-
related and ethno-religious dynamics 
have in many cases facilitated regional 
spillover of such conflicts, but the core 
problem lies with bad governance and 
54
S T R A T E G I C  T R E N D S  2 0 1 2
have more than enough domestic 
frustrations to be protesting against 
corrupt and ineffective governments. 
But even more worrying is that what 
might initially appear to be cohe-
sive anti-government movements 
will likely fracture and split, add-
ing to further unrest and instability. 
Uncontainable conflict could be the 
result, particularly as international 
peacekeeping capabilities grow short 
of cash. There are too many fires, and 
not enough money to put an end to 
current conflicts. With Western poli-
ticians transfixed with the financial 
crisis and Asian powers unable (or 
unwilling) to fill the gaps, it is un-
likely that anyone will come to the 
Middle or the Horn’s rescue if new 
crises break out. This means serious 
governance work needs to start, and 
it has to start now. Africa cannot wait 
any longer.
global unrest as seen in the MENA 
region will affect security in the rest 
of Africa. Should the revolutionary 
wave engulf sub-Saharan Africa, we 
can expect to see nation-wide and 
regional anti-government uprisings 
with severe violence. A dangerous 
mix of multiple stakeholders, cor-
rupt resource deals, dispersed rebel 
groups, and weak governance in an 
increasingly regionalised game is far 
from promising for conflict resolu-
tion. With regional conflicts more 
and more facilitated by modern 
communication and Chinese infra-
structure, potential regional violence 
below the Sahara is likely to adopt 
dreadful proportions.
Unemployed miners in the DRC, 
militias trapped in the ‘wrong Sudan’, 
Somali men choosing the piracy path, 
and anti-government rebels in Kenya 
